Ludwig Wittgenstein

The solution of the problem of life is seen in the vanishing of the problem.

What is essential to us, in our experience, is not that there is a 'this' and a 'that', but that there is a 'this' and a 'that' in a certain relation.

The problems arising through a misinterpretation of our forms of language have the character of depth. They are deep disquietudes; their roots are as deep in us as the forms of our language and their importance is as great as the importance of our language.

It is not our business to solve scientific problems, but to clarify concepts.

The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy when I want to.

My aim is: to teach you to pass from a piece of disguised nonsense to something that is undisguised nonsense.

The only way to escape from the philosophical muddle is to stop doing philosophy.

I don't know why we are here, but I'm pretty sure that it is not in order to enjoy ourselves.

The world of the happy is quite another than that of the unhappy.

The real problem is not whether machines think but whether men do.

An honest religious thinker is like a tightrope walker. He almost looks as though he were walking on nothing but air. His support is the slenderest imaginable. And yet it is possible to walk on it.

The greatest danger in philosophy is to fall in love with one's own constructions.

My fundamental conception is that the 'logical constants' are not representatives; that there can be no representatives of the logic of facts.

The only way to learn philosophy is to do it.

The problems of philosophy are not empirical problems; they are solved by looking into the workings of our language, not by looking into the world.

The philosopher must be a man of courage.

The aim of philosophy is to make clear the logical structure of thought.

The whole point of philosophy is to get rid of philosophy.

My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as senseless, when he has used them—as steps—to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.)

It is not our aim to refine or complete the system of rules for the use of our words in an unforeseen way, or by supplying new rules, but to make the rules transparent.