Jerry Fodor

If there is a science of the mind, it must be a science of the mental structures that mediate the causal relations between proximal stimuli and distal percepts.

The mind is not a blank slate; it has an innate structure that constrains and guides learning.

Modules are domain-specific, informationally encapsulated, mandatorily operated, and fast.

The more global (the less modular) a cognitive system is, the less hope there is of understanding how it works.

You can't have a science of everything.

The problem with cognitive science is that it's too cognitive and not enough science.

There is no such thing as a 'theory of everything' in psychology.

The mind is not a general-purpose computer; it's a collection of specialized modules.

The only thing that makes a thought a thought is its content.

Meaning is not in the head; it's in the world.

Concepts are atomic and unanalyzable.

The idea that concepts are learned by abstraction from experience is a myth.

The mind is not a connectionist network.

Connectionism is a bad idea, and it's bad science.

The problem with cognitive science is that it has no theory of cognition.

The mind is not a general-purpose problem solver.

The only way to understand the mind is to understand its architecture.

The mind is a collection of specialized mechanisms, each designed to solve a specific problem.

The mind is not a blank slate; it's a highly structured system.

The only way to do science is to make strong claims and then try to falsify them.