Paul Churchland

The eliminative materialist is not denying that we have pains, beliefs, and desires. He is denying that these are the kinds of states we have. He is denying that the folk psychological categories are the right categories.

Our common-sense conception of psychological phenomena constitutes a radically false theory, a theory so fundamentally defective that both its principles and its ontology are bound to be displaced, rather than smoothly reduced, by completed neuroscience.

The history of science is replete with cases where our common-sense ontology has been overthrown by a more powerful and accurate scientific theory.

Folk psychology is not just a theory, it is a bad theory.

The brain is not a digital computer, and the mind is not a program.

The mind is the brain, and the brain is a complex dynamical system.

We are not trying to reduce the mind to the brain, but to understand the mind as the brain.

The explanatory failures of folk psychology are legion and of long standing.

The brain is a connectionist machine, not a symbol-manipulating machine.

Our introspective awareness of our own mental states is not a direct apprehension of their true nature.

The future of psychology lies in neuroscience, not in folk psychology.

The categories of folk psychology are not natural kinds.

The mind is a product of the brain's activity, not a separate entity.

We should not be afraid to abandon our cherished folk theories if they are found to be false.

The success of neuroscience will ultimately lead to the elimination of folk psychology.

The brain is a parallel processor, not a serial processor.

The concept of 'belief' may be as outdated as the concept of 'phlogiston'.

Our understanding of the mind will advance only when we embrace a neuroscientific perspective.

The brain is a pattern-recognizing machine.

The mind is not a ghost in the machine, but the machine itself.